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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
T he intensification of the greenhouse effectthrough human activity poses global environ-mental problems of a kind never previously en-
countered in history. A potential victim, but also a
cause of the current dramatic climatic changes, China
must, as a matter of urgency, take stock of the risks it
runs and establish workable strategies to respond to the
problems. The aim of this article is to highlight the po-
tential impacts of climate change on the water re-
sources and agriculture of northern China((1). 
The application of the MAGICC-SCENGEN((2) model
to China shows that temperatures could well increase
by between 0.6°C and 1.3°C between now and 2030
and from 1.2°C to 2.3°C by 2050. If this happens, the
north of the country would warm up more rapidly than
the south. The rainfall pattern would also be affected
and the model predicts a slight increase over most of
the country with a reduction in the central plains
(Figure 1).
To analyse the implications of climate change we need
to begin with the risks involved in climatic variability
and the management of natural resources, and to
analyse how the anticipated climate changes might
increase those risks. In China, the water resource situ-
ation in the northern plains is central to developmental
issues. The balance between water availability and
water use has already been upset and this trend could
be aggravated by climate change. The increasing scarci-
ty of water, together with competition from industry
and urban centres, places the capacity of agricultural
irrigation under great pressure. Cereal production, a
sector heavily dependent on irrigation, is thus faced












Figure 1. Variations in temperatures and
rainfall in 2030 compared with 1990, 
scenario A1B
1. IPCC, Climate Change 2007, The Physical Science Basis, Summary for the Policymakers,
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, 2007.
2. Mike Hulme et al., Using a Climate Scenario Generator for Vulnerability and Adaptation
Assessments: MAGICC & SCENGEN Version 2.4, Climatic Research Unit, UEA, Norwich, 2000.
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The  water  chal lenge in  China:shortages  in  regions  and c it ies
L imited r esources,  unevenly di str ibut edand overexplo ited
At first glance, China seems to be a country with relatively
abundant water resources. Usable resources are estimated at
2,812 billion cubic metres per year, putting China sixth in
world ranking. Seen in terms of population, however, avail-
able resources are only some 2,200 cubic metres per capita
per year, one of the lowest levels in the world, although one
that still places China above the threshold of “water
stress.”((3) But the seriousness of the water situation in China
is best illustrated by the large regional disparities. While
demand is growing across the whole country, available water
supplies in the north (757 cubic metres per head) represent
only one quarter of those of the south (3,208), which places
the whole of the northern region in a state of water scarcity.
Northern China, where 42% of the population live and,
above all, where 60% of all arable land is located, have only
14% of China’s water resources. Seen in terms of hydro-
graphic basins, the contrasts are even more striking (Graph
1). The rates of resource utilisation in the northern basins
are often three or four times those in the south and frequent-
ly exceed overexploitation thresholds. In the basin of the
Hai River, in particular, these rates exceed 95%.
Despite these limited resources, we are now witnessing a sig-
nificant increase in total demand, principally from industry
and urban centres. Crop irrigation continues to be the heav-
iest user of water resources accounting for 67% of the water
consumed, followed by industry which now accounts for
21% of demand((4). Water used by agriculture has, however,
only increased marginally since 1980, although China has,
for several years, been pursuing its program of food self-suf-
ficiency. On the other hand, in the context of China’s sub-
stantial economic growth and accelerated industrialisation,
use by industry has increased threefold. The growth in
domestic use is also due in very large measure to the needs
of towns and cities. Consumption grows strongly as urban
households, where the middle classes increasingly live,
adopt characteristic levels of use. 
Despite the shortages, water is used relatively inefficiently.
The pollution of most Chinese waterways is also a contribut-
ing factor to the scarcity of the resource. According to the
SEPA((5), 34% of the waters of the seven main Chinese
rivers are heavily polluted. The Pearl River and the Yangtze
are generally of good quality, but the same cannot be said of
most of the waterways in the north of the country which suf-
fer from chronic pollution, and where the state of the Hai
River is particularly alarming.
Water is particularly scarce in the basin of the “3-H”. This
region encompasses the three principal rivers of northern
China, the Huanghe (Yellow River) and the Hai and Huai
rivers. It includes the cities of Beijing and Tianjin as well as
China’s main agricultural provinces. The basin of the 3-H,
China’s “cereal granary”, accounts for 39% of its arable
land, is home to 460 million people, and produces one-third
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3. The United Nations and the World Bank consider that a country is in “water stress” when
the annual available resources per capita are less than or equal to 2000 cubic metres,
and in water scarcity when they are less than or equal to 1000. Below 500, a country is
in absolute water scarcity. These figures include both domestic usage and water used
for productive purposes.
4. World Bank, China Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China, Main Report,
Washington DC, 2002.
5. SEPA (State Environmental Protection Administration), Report on the State of the










esGraph 1. Water resource usage rates in the
principal Chinese water basins
of its GDP, but has only 10% of the country’s water
resources. The World Bank estimated that the region’s water
deficit in 2000 had already reached 39 billion cubic metres
and average availability per head to be only 525 cubic metres
per year, well below scarcity levels. Water shortages are also
emerging in the rapidly growing urban centres. It is estimat-
ed that of China’s 600 cities 400 are in water poverty and of
the latter, 110 are experiencing serious shortages. They are
concentrated principally in the north of the country. 
To make up for shortages of surface water, underground
sources are tapped more and more frequently in the north
and their rates of utilisation are often higher than their rates
of replenishment. In 1995, it was estimated that under-
ground water sources met about 60% of the need in the
urban areas of the 3-Hs region, and every year Beijing takes
75% of its consumption from non-renewable aquifers. As a
result of this overuse, the levels of underground reserves
have fallen from 50 metres to 90 metres in the Hai river
plains and from 100 metres to 300 metres in the Beijing
region, resulting in problems of saline intrusion in the
reserves near the coast and severe damage to buildings in
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai.
The e ff ect  o f  worsening  drought  condit ions
The structural scarcity of water is thus the result of the
unequal distribution of water resources between the north
and the south, of the size of the population and of the
increasing pace of urbanisation and industrialisation. It is
also the result of climate trends observed in recent decades.
The long-term data show that temperatures have increased
steadily since the 1960s resulting in increased evaporation.
At the same time, rainfall levels show a downward trend,
particularly in the northern plains((6). These changes partly
explain the sometimes dramatic decreases in surface flows. 
A major contributing factor in the water crisis is the impact
of drought. Since the 1980s, the frequency, magnitude and
length of droughts have been increasing, with severe conse-
quences. China has been seriously affected over the last ten
years and the northern plains have experienced seven con-
secutive years of drought, a record since the establishment
of the People’s Republic of China. The years 2000, 2002
and 2006 saw the worst droughts for fifty years. 
The greater frequency of droughts and increasing water util-
isation result in particularly worrying situations such as that
of the Yellow River, cradle of the Han civilisation and heart-
land of the main cereal growing area, which today looks like
a “worn out old man.” Water flows have been decreasing for
thirty years((7) and every year between 1985 and 2000 the
river dried up before reaching the Yellow Sea (Graph 2).
The drought periods are getting longer and the geographical
area affected is growing: in 1996, for the first time, the
waters of the Huanghe (Yellow River) did not reach the
province of Shandong. In 1997, the situation was exacerbat-
ed by drought and these waters barely reached Hebei
province. In that year, the drought lasted 227 days compared
with 40 at the beginning of the 1990s a record((8).
Thus, water shortages in north China are alarming and
Graph 2. Rainfall and water flow trends in
the basin of the Yellow River
6. Jianping Yang et al., “Fluctuations of the Semi-Arid Zone in China and Consequences for
Society,” Climatic Change, 72 (1-2), 2005, pp. 171-188.
7. YRCC (Yellow River Conservancy Commission), Yellow River in the 20th Century, Yellow
River Water Utilization Publisher, 2001.
8. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Towards a Food Crisis in China and the World,” interview with
Lester Brown, Perspectives Chinoises, nº 18, 1997, p. 1.
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numerous indicators show that the situation has been getting
worse over the last twenty years in the wake of economic devel-
opment, urbanisation and worsening droughts. Water scarcity
is especially costly for the country’s economic and social devel-
opment. The drought that struck China in 2002, for example,
affected 65 million people and cost US$1.2 billion((9).The  future  to  2030:  increasedr isks  due  to  c l imate  change
Water  shortage  trends… 
The problem of water security in the northern regions is a
priority developmental concern for China. Analysis of con-
sumption trends and for possibilities of increasing supplies
over the coming decades shows that water deficits are going
to get worse, and could be exacerbated by climate change.
The situation in the northern plains and the future of the 3-
H basin give a clear picture of the challenge that China will
have to face between 2000 and 2050.
According to World Bank projections((10), the total demand
for water in this region will increase by 20% between 2000
and 2050((11), reaching a volume of 200 billion cubic
metres. The increase in requirement, particularly pro-
nounced between 2000 and 2020, approximately 7% each
decade, will be due essentially to domestic and industrial
needs in the urban areas which are expected to increase by
66% and 56% respectively between 2000 and 2020. On
the supply side, the potential for additional capacity is very
limited in the basin of the 3-H, all options already being
utilised more or less to their maximum. Supply in this
region will in all likelihood increase by only ten billion
cubic metres between now and 2020 and then stabilise
rapidly.
The water supply deficit in the basin of the 3-H is bound
to get much worse. Estimated at 39 billion cubic metres in
2000, it will increase by 25% by 2020 and by 46% by
2050, to reach 57 billion cubic metres. Kaiyuan jieliu,
which literally means “open up new sources and economise
on use,” is a well known saying in the management of water
resources in China. The introduction of further measures of
adaptation to scarcity would enable a reduction in the gap
between needs and availability((12). On the demand side, an
increase in the price of water of 10% per year and a 10%
improvement in irrigation efficiency above the baseline sce-
nario would reduce the water deficit by 14% in 2020 and
by 22% in 2050. On the supply side, recycling waste water
would further improve the situation by 4%, while the intro-
duction of inter-regional transfers from the south to the
north would reduce water deficits by an additional 22%.
Taken together, these four measures would therefore reduce
the gap between supply and demand by 39% by 2020.
However, despite the significant effects that such a scenario
would entail, water deficits would remain substantial
(Graph 3).
Graph 3. Supply and demand trends and
water deficits in the 3H basin
9. EM-DAT, The International Disaster Database, http://www.em-dat.net/
10. World Bank, China Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China, op. cit..
11. These projections assume an 8% improvement in irrigation efficiency and a 2% annual
increase in the price of water.
12. World Bank, China Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China, op. cit..
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…exacerbated by  c l imate  change
Water shortage trends in northern China could be made
worse by climate change. Changes in temperature and rain-
fall patterns anticipated by 2030-2050 will alter the timing
and magnitude of water flows in rivers, with major implica-
tions for water resources and their management. 
The adaptability of water resources to climate change
depends on their vulnerability and their sensitivity to the
changes. Given the amount of water being taken out, the
overexploitation of deep aquifers, and the variability of
flows, the water supply systems in northern China seem
increasingly vulnerable. Thus, there is, generally speaking,
little room for manœuvre. The sensitivity of water resources
to climate change increases as one moves from the wet south
to the semi-arid north: small changes in rainfall or tempera-
ture would have major effects on water resources. Model
results show that water flows will decrease significantly in
many northern basins and increase in the north-east and the
south((13). The basins of the Huai and Huang rivers seem
particularly at risk as flow reductions of 11% and 6% respec-
tively are expected. The Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region,
already severely affected by limited water availability, would
also not be spared (Table 1).
In addition to these average flow variations, climate change
will increase the frequency and magnitude of extreme mete-
orological events such as droughts. Changes in drought pat-
terns are a key aspect of risk assessment since such events
are already having severe socio-economic impacts. In the 3H
basin, drought years lead to increased water deficits of about
75% compared with normal years, due both to a decrease in
annual supply of 5.5% and an increase in demand from irri-
gation of some 15%((14). Given the impact of droughts over
the last fifteen years, one can anticipate that the effects of
climate change on the frequency of such events over the
coming decades will involve enormous risks for water
resource management and the satisfaction of needs.An agri cultural  reg ionparticular ly  vulnerable  tocl imate  change
Water  shortages  is sues for  agr iculture  innorthern  China 
The increasing scarcity of water, and competition from other
economic sectors, put the irrigation capacity of the northern
regions under great pressure. Cereal production, a sector
heavily dependent on irrigation, is thus faced with an
unprecedented challenge. In the 3H basin, agriculture is the
principal consumer of water, but the sector also bears the
brunt of most of the shortage since it accounts for more than
80% of the region’s total deficit. Every year more than a
quarter of the demand from agriculture is not met. In drought
years, deficits for crops are roughly doubled and reach 62 bil-
lion cubic metres. Agriculture, whose needs increase during
drought years while availability falls, ends up acting as a
buffer to ensure that the needs of other sectors are met. In
those years, agriculture is often sacrificed to limit water short-
age increases in industry and domestic households.
The structural inadequacy of water supply and the increased
frequency of droughts are substantially reducing the poten-
Table 1. Expected variations in temperature, rainfall, evaporation and water flows in four river
basins in northern China
13. Ying Aiwen, Impact of Global Climate Change on China’s Water Resources,
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 61(1), 2000, pp. 187-191.
14. World Bank, China Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China, op. cit..
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tial of the agricultural sector. In average years, models show
that water shortages reduce annual grain production by 15%,
or 20 million tonnes, in the 3-H basin. In the Hai river basin,
potential cereal production is reduced by more than 20%.
Water resources available for irrigation have not increased for
twenty years although the area of land under irrigation has
grown by nearly 17%, indicating a decline in water availabil-
ity per hectare((15). Together with the increased number of
drought years, this unfavourable condition has resulted in a
decline in cereal production over five consecutive years.
Between 1999 and 2003, crop yields fell by 17.5%, and in
2000 alone, when drought was particularly severe, grain pro-
duction have fallen by 10.5%((16). This sector’s strong sensitiv-
ity to water and climate conditions suggests that it could be
one of the hardest hit by global warming.
Vulnerab il it y and sens it i vity  o f  theagr icul tura l  sec tor  
The agricultural situation suggests that many areas of north-
ern China would be at once very sensitive and very vulnera-
ble to climate change. Expected changes in temperature and
rainfall over the coming decades point to an increase in irri-
gation needs in a context in which there will be a drop in the
amount of water available. An increasing frequency of
droughts would seriously exacerbate this problem. Broadly
speaking, climate change will lead to a shift in agro-climatic
belts towards the north of China, thus posing a challenge to
the semi-arid regions of the 3-H basin. The overall impact
on yields in the principal cereal growing areas will be nega-
tive((17).
Agro-climatic models indicate that the combination of
changes in temperatures, rainfall and evapotranspiration will
increase water deficits in cultivable soils from 20mm to
60mm in the northern plains, with corresponding increases
in irrigation needs((18). Four regions in northern China which
are particularly sensitive to climate change are in danger of
falling below certain crucial water thresholds: the region
close to the Great Wall, the plains of the Huanghe and Hai
rivers, the north of the Huai River and the Loess plateau.
These areas are likely to experience an increased risk of
drought, an increase in water deficits, and problems of
15. Hong Yang, Zehner A., “China’s Regional Water Scarcity and Implications for Grain
Supply and Trade,” Environment and Planning A, nº 33, 2001, pp. 79-95.
16. FAO, http://faostat.fao.org, 2006.
17. Ana Iglesias et al., “Climate Change in Asia: A Review of the Vulnerability and Adaptation
of Crop Production,” Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, n° 92, pp. 13-27, 1996.
18. Fulu Tao et al., “Future Climate Change, The Agricultural Water Cycle, and Agricultural
Production in China,” Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 95(1), 2003, pp. 203-215.
N o  2 0 0 7 / 1 35
Peasants working in the fields in the vicinity of a power
plant, Shanxi province
desertification. Vulnerability indicators based on the agricul-
tural context and the socio-economic capacity to adapt show
that among the thirty Chinese provinces, Shanxi, Inner
Mongolia, Gansu, Hebei and Ningxia would be especially at
risk and the least able to adapt to climate change((19). In north-
ern China, the most sensitive regions are thus also the most
vulnerable and comprise the greater part of the 3-H basin.
An unfavourab le  context  o f  inter -secto ra lcompetit ion  for  water
The context of inter-sectoral competition for water in which cli-
mate change is taking place is an essential consideration in
anticipating the risks for agriculture. In the 3-H region, 80% of
cultivated land is irrigated and these water flows are a vital fac-
tor in the system of double annual harvests which characteris-
es the region and which underpins its status as China’s cereal
granary. Agriculture is the main consumer of water but it is not
a priority sector. Water allocation increasingly favours industri-
al and domestic needs, especially during periods of drought.
Thus, reductions in water availability due to climate change
place a double burden on agriculture: its need for water grows
as drought conditions worsen, while at the same time reduc-
tions in supply mean that its share of the water available will
be correspondingly less. Variations in irrigation according to cli-
matic conditions illustrate the situation well: droughts reduce
the area of cultivated land totally irrigated by 20 points and
increase the rainfall dependent areas and those partly under
irrigation by 13.5 and 6.5 points respectively (Graph 4). To
the extent that climate change will increase the frequency of
drought years, the risks for irrigation capacity seem enormous.
ZWhile it is conceivable that adaptation policies for water
supply and demand can be found for the north of the coun-
try, it is clear that agriculture will have to rely very largely on
its own capacity to use water more economically. The poten-
tial for water saving in this sector is sizeable in the short
term, but it could, nonetheless, be limited by climate change.
As far as south-north transfers are concerned, which is the
principal source of future additional water for north China,
there is little cause for optimism because, like all the large-
scale projects planned or under construction, the aim is not
to increase irrigation((20). At best, agriculture would only
receive a residual part of the transfers, priority always being
given to urban needs((21). Irrigation’s marginal status in water
allocation seems unavoidable: the economic gain from each
unit of water consumed by agriculture is small compared
with other sectors, and the low price paid for irrigation
water, compared with water for industrial and domestic uses,
encourages local administrators to divert water from agricul-
ture to other sectors((22). In this context, climate change could
exacerbate inter-sectoral conflicts about water which have
already turned violent at times((23).
Impact  on  agr icul tura l  yie lds
Models indicate that climate change will have a generally
negative effect on Chinese agricultural performance even
though new areas in the extreme north of the country could
become suitable for agriculture. The three principal crops,
wheat, rice and maize, will see their yields reduced by an
average of 10% during the first half of the twenty-first centu-
ry. Increases in temperatures will shorten the growth periods
of crops and the nutritional quality of cereals, but the main
effects on agriculture will come from increasing droughts and
water shortages. It is anticipated that wheat yields will
decrease by an average of 4% in the irrigated zones to 16%
Graph 4. Distribution of irrigation possibilities
in the 3H basin according to climatic 
conditions, projected to 2030
19. Lin Erda, “Agricultural Vulnerability and Adaptation to Global Warming in China,” Water,
Air, and Soil Pollution, nº 92, pp. 63-73, 1996.
20. Hong Yang , Zehner A., “China’s Regional Water Scarcity and Implications for Grain
Supply and Trade,” op. cit..
21. ZSN, Chinese Water Conservation Yearbook, Water and Electricity Publishing House,
Beijing, 1997.
22. The economic benefits of inter-regional transfers through the central route are estimat-
ed at 0.99 yuan per cubic metre of water in urban and industrial sectors as against 0.56
for agriculture. For the same project, the average price of water provided to industry is
thought to be 0.31 yuan per cubic metre and 0.06 yuan for agriculture (ZSN, Chinese
Water Conservation Yearbook, op. cit.)
23. For example, on 6 July 2000, thousands of farmers from the northern plains clashed
with police, reacting angrily to a government project which allocated water from certain
dams to cities and industry rather than irrigation.
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in the rainfall-dependent areas((24). Maize crops will also be
affected since models indicate that harvests will fall by 5%.
Here again, rainfall-dependent crops seem much more sen-
sitive to climate change((25). Finally, in the case of rice, pro-
ductivity would decrease progressively from 6% to 17% from
north to south((26). Increases in climate variability and
droughts will further increase the probability of poor har-
vests. Climate change could also aggravate problems of
desertification given rising temperatures and the greater
unpredictability of rainfall; it would also lead to an increase
in the use of fertilizers and pesticides, which would have
implications for water and soil quality.
The impact of increasing droughts on farming could be
severe bearing in mind the vulnerability of irrigation capaci-
ty. Given the poor economic yield of cereal production per
unit of water consumed, and the increased scarcity of this
resource in the north of China, one could expect a reduction
in the area of irrigated land. Decreased capacity for season-
al irrigation could jeopardise the system of double annual
harvests. Given the monsoon climate prevailing in the
region, winter crops, more or less wholly reliant on irrigation,
would seem to be under particularly threat. 
These changes in the agricultural capacity of China imply
major economic and social risks for farmers. The increased
probability of poor harvests could undermine improvements
in their standard of living at a time when they already seem
to be the forgotten people of China’s rapid economic devel-
opment. In particular, increased droughts and resultant crop
losses could very soon put at risk farmers’ capacity to absorb
these shocks and lead them to swell the ranks of the rural
exodus to the flourishing urban centres or to other more
promising farming regions. These “climate refugees” are
already a reality and their movements could even be directed
24. The fertilizer effect of CO2 could limit these impacts very considerably, but these effects
are still poorly understood.
25. Wang Jinghua, Lin Erda, “The Impacts of Potential Climate Change and Climate
Variability on Simulated Maize Production in China”, Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, n° 92,
1996, pp. 75-85.
26. UNFCCC National Communication, The People’s Republic of China, Initial National
Communication on Climate Change, 2004.
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Hebei province, 130 km from Beijing : desertification at
the doorstep
by the central government as in the case of the 2006 drought
which saw nearly 30,000 peasant farmers move from
Chongqing and Chengdu to Xinjiang.
Food se lf- suf fic iency  versus importation ofvir tual  water
Finally, one can view the risks to agriculture of climate
change in the context of the uncertainty surrounding future
cereal production and China’s capacity to meet its own
needs. The issue of food security and the potential impact
of China’s entry into world agricultural markets are burning
questions. In 1994, L. Brown, in an article entitled “Who
will feed China?” highlighted the issue and sparked a lively
debate. His analysis is simple: China’s decreasing capacity
to produce cereals in consequence of the loss of arable lands
that follow industrialisation and growing water deficits will
require it to import enormous quantities of cereals((27). The
consequences of this would be significant price increases on
world markets and a growing threat to the food security and
political stability of developing countries. Climate change
could accelerate these trends, exacerbating water deficits
and adding greatly to the loss of arable lands through
increased desertification. 
This need for large-scale reliance on world markets to meet
cereal requirements has not yet arisen. Nevertheless, falls in
production between 1999 and 2003 could be sustained,
without any real increase in imports, only through repeated
calls on cereal stocks built up between 1996 and 2002 to
make up for an annual deficit of 30 million tonnes. If, as is
likely, climate change reduces production capacity, it does
not necessarily follow that an agricultural crisis in China will
be likely. The effects on world markets would depend more
specifically on the strategies China adopted to respond to
the water crisis. The physical capacity to produce the cere-
als China needed to feed itself would still be sufficient, but
the rational response would not necessarily make maximum
use of land and water resources((28).
It could in fact become economically efficient to have
recourse to world markets and participate in “virtual water
trade,”((29) by importing water in the form of cereals. At pres-
ent, one cubic metre of water is needed to produce one kilo-
gram of cereals. If ten million tonnes of cereals were import-
ed rather than produced in the northern plains, close to ten
billion cubic metres of water would be saved. The limited
water and land resources could then be used more efficient-
ly, planting different crops with a high value-added compo-
nent, for example, with a view to export possibilities. Given
China’s increasing comparative disadvantage in cereal pro-
duction and its progressive integration into the world econo-
my, larger cereal imports seem inevitable. Importing virtual
water would seem to be an appropriate strategy not only
because it would significantly reduce stress on northern
China’s water resources, but also because it would be in
keeping with the direction in which the Chinese economy is
moving. It remains to be seen if the China of market social-
ism will be prepared to challenge the Maoist regime’s prin-
ciple of self-sufficiency in food.
The fact remains, however, that there are continuing uncer-
tainties surrounding trends in the world’s capacity for cereal
production, particularly in a context of climate change. The
effects of such a strategy on the ability of the poorest devel-
oping countries to purchase the cereals they need on world
markets may not all be benign. Conclusion
Climate change poses an unprecedented challenge to the
water and agricultural systems of northern China. Although
the balance has often been upset, expected rises in temper-
atures could accelerate the existing situation of worsening
water deficits and the deterioration of arable lands. In addi-
tion, there are risks of flooding in coastal cities threatened
by rising sea levels, and the enlargement of areas affected by
certain vector diseases such as malaria. The early implemen-
tation of appropriate response measures to respond to the
new situation, which in the case of agriculture would involve
water policies structured around the scarcity of the resource,
could reduce these risks and at the same time deal with pres-
ent problems. In this context, the international community
should, while striving to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
formulate proposals to help developing countries adapt to
the changing circumstances. •
• Translated by Peter Brown
27. Brown’s analysis is consistent with other studies, in particular those of the World Bank
and the United States Department of Agriculture.
28. G. K. Heilig, China Food, Can China Feed Itself?, IIASA, Laxenburg, 1999.
29. T. Allan, Water, Peace and the Middle East: Negotiating Water in the Jordan Basin, IB
Tauris, London, 1996.
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